are the same for all; and what these aVections are likenesses of-things in the worldare indeed the same for all. 4 Between the thirteenth and the fourteenth century all authors concerned with the semantics of names quote this passage with approval. The crucial question they further ask is what kind of things the aVections in the soul are. The answers they give to this questions are widely diVerent.
5
In this article, I will focus on Duns Scotus's approach to the signi cation of names of rst intention. I will take into consideration three To answer these questions, I will rst present Scotus's position on signi cation in his two commentaries on Peri hermeneias. Then I will turn to his remarks on the same topic in the Lectura and Ordinatio. Finally, I will give a brief account of the positions held by some authors writing in Paris in the last two decades of the thirteenth century.
I will conclude that Scotus's fair assessment of the two main positions on signi cation is exceptional among his contemporaries. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence that he ever prefers one position over the other. Speci cally, and contrary to what is usually held, there is no evidence that he ever commits himself to a defence of the primary signi cation of the thing. He simply assumed that doctrine in the course of an argument, in order to show that it is compatible with the doctrine of concepts he defends. I will also show that late in his career he explicitly criticises the presuppositions on which the supporters of the primary signi cation of things usually base their views.
All the same, it is true that Scotus's treatment of signi cation will prove to be very in uential. For one thing, his commentaries on Peri hermeneias
